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Economic background 
The global economy is experiencing a significant 
contraction due to the spreading effects of the sub-prime 
and financial crisis. This has greater effects in the main 
developed economies (US, UK, France, Germany and 
Japan) but the repercussions affect countries such as 
Russia, China and India, where a sharp downturn in global 
growth adversely impacts on their growth. Trade is down 
and both the IMF and the OECD have recently revised 
down their expectations for growth and trade. With global 
growth predicted to be only 0.5 per cent this year, the world 
is facing perhaps its deepest recession yet, although it is 
too early to call it a depression. Indeed the early co-
ordinated response of the main economies to deal 
effectively with the situation will probably avoid a 1930s 
style depression. This does not mean however that there 
will be a quick recovery – it is more likely that the recession 
will be deeper and longer than any previous recession, 
certainly since the end of World War II.  
 
The UK economy is not immune from this, and contracted 
by 1.5 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2008. The common 
expectation is that the first quarter of 2009 will also 
produce very weak data and that the economy will continue 
to shrink through 2009. Many forecasters expect the UK 
economy to contract by about 2.7 to 3.1 per cent this year. 
The UK recession is broad based affecting: banking, 
services manufacturing and construction. The Bank of 
England has lowered interest rates to 1 per cent – its 
lowest level ever since 1694 (the year of its founding) and 
is offering a number of other measures to support the 
economy:  the Special Liquidity Scheme and it intends to 
operate ‘Quantitative Easing’ – a method of extending the 
money supply without printing extra money. This will 
involve swapping government gilts for corporate bonds – a 
key objective of this is to reduce the interbank lending rate 
(Libor) so that lending between banks becomes easier. In 
the UK CPI inflation is expected to be close to 1 per cent 
although in the second half of 2009 deflation cannot be 
discounted. Public sector borrowing was set to be £78 
billion but this may grow to £87.5 billion by the end of the 
year as the government continues to support the economy. 
This weakens sterling considerably particularly against the 
Euro. In Oct-Dec 2008 UK unemployment hit an 11-year 
high at 1.97 million. It is unlikely that the UK will experience 
a V-shaped recovery and that 2010 will also be a very 
tough year. It is more probable that the UK will experience 
a longer recession with a slower recovery from the end of 
2010 onwards. 
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The Scottish economy 
Scottish GVA growth in 2008Q3 was -0.8 per cent leaving 
growth for the last four quarters on the preceding four 
quarters at 1.4 per cent. These data however are likely to 
be supplemented by very weak growth in 2008Q4 leaving 
growth for 2008 in the 0.5 to 0.7 per cent range. Exports 
are also likely to be poor. Manufacturing and services 
growth for 2008 are likely to be close to 1 per cent for the 
year based on the 2008Q3 data and assuming weaker data 
for 2008Q4 they may perform more poorly. Construction 
will probably contract by approximately 2.7 to 3 per cent in 
2008. Most service sectors had negative growth in 2008Q3 
and the expectation is for more of the same in 2008Q4. 
 
The employment rate in Scotland fell by 1.1 per cent on a 
year ago to 75.4 per cent for the three months to 
December 2008. Unemployment rose to 137,000 (5.1 per 
cent), up 0.3 per cent on the year. The claimant count 
measure of unemployment was 101,100 (3.7 per cent) in 
January 2009, up by 1.2 per cent annually. So as there is 
weakening growth in the economy, falling exports and a 
deteriorating labour market: it is clear that Scotland is in 
recession. The forecasts for the Scottish economy are 
made in the context of this worsening economic situation. 
 
Final demand 
The drivers of the economy are consumption; government 
spending; investment; tourism and exports (to the rest of 
the UK and to the rest of the world). For all three scenarios 
the main effects from the current economic climate are: 
 
 Investment declines sharply in 2009 and recovers 
slowly thereafter – in the central scenario this 
decline is slightly steeper and longer whereas in 
the last case the contraction is severe and growth 
is not seen until 2012; 
 
 Traditionally Scottish consumption holds up 
relatively well in a UK downturn – in this recession 
Scottish consumption indicators point to a 
significant fall in 2009 with mild recovery following. 
In the worse case scenario the decline is slightly 
sharper but more importantly it lasts considerably 
longer and it is 2012 before consumption returns 
to about 1 per cent growth; 
 
 Government consumption is held to be constant 
with a fixed budget to the Scottish Parliament. The 
UK government spending in Scotland will be 
substantial with increased benefit flows; a share of 
the fiscal stimulus (perhaps adding between 0.25 
to 0.3 per cent to GVA in 2009 and 2010) and 
rescue packages for RBS and Lloyds Banking 
Group (for HBOS); 
 
 Tourism is expected to perform poorly in terms of 
increased GVA – volumes might rise slightly but 
the assessment is that revenues from tourist 
expenditure will fall. Across the three scenarios 
this is reflected as a small negative effect except 
the last one where it is a large negative impact 
over two years and 
 
 Exports fall considerably, particularly to the UK as 
its economy shrinks. The expectation is that in the 
optimistic scenario recovery of all exports will take 
place in 2011; in the central scenario exports to 
the rest of the world are better than that to the rest 
of the UK and in the last case that recovery is 
weak in 2011 and does not really impact until 
2012.  
 
Background to the forecast 
The previous forecast was scenario based with a number 
of factors that potentially impact on economic performance. 
It was clear that if the banks returned to the government for 
more money for re-capitalisation then the worst case 
situation from the previous forecast would apply. That 
occurred in February and it also fits with poor bank lending 
conditions. On the up-side monetary policy has been quick 
to respond and is supportive as is fiscal policy. The 
Scottish labour market remains more buoyant than its UK 
counterpart but the rate of job shedding is accelerating. 
This may indicate that Scotland is simply catching up with 
the rest of the UK. Traditionally however, the Scottish 
economy does relatively better than the rest of the UK in a 
downturn but this particular recession appears to be much 
tougher and deeper than expected. It is the speed and the 
depth of the contraction that has taken most people by 
surprise. This is why most forecasters have shifted their 
expectations down considerably. The outcome of this may 
be that Scotland does not outperform the UK economy but 
different paths are possible thus a scenario forecast is the 
best tool to use in the current economic situation. The 
forecast is presented in three scenarios to reflect the very 
different paths that the economy could take, given 
particular events occurring. These scenarios are: 
 
 Optimistic; 
 Central and 
 Worst. 
 
The factors that support these scenarios are described 
briefly in each section. The scenarios are determined by 
the same variables used in the last forecast. As they were 
discussed in significant depth in the last FEC the factors 
are more succinctly presented here. 
 
The forecast 
 
The optimistic scenario 
This is the most probable result if the following outcomes 
actually prevail. The main influences under this scenario 
are: 
 
 The labour market in Scotland remains relatively 
buoyant and outperforms that of the UK with the 
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employment rate being higher and the 
unemployment rate being lower than their UK 
counterparts; 
 
 Businesses can secure funding from banks and 
other financial institutions relatively more easily as 
bank lending improves significantly resulting in a 
smooth flow of funds in the Scottish economy; 
 
 Confidence holds up more in Scotland as 
spending in retail; investment and exports hold up. 
Manufacturing makes a significant contribution to 
the economy; 
 
 External demand is a key factor here and 
supports export growth while tourism is not 
severely affected and 
 
 House prices are not depressed for too long and 
the expectation is for recovery to start by mid-
2010 but definitely by 2011. 
 
Critically appraising the above, it is clear that at the 
beginning of 2009, there are not many signs of lending 
becoming more efficient and similarly confidence is very 
weak at the moment. There are few indications of a quick 
recovery although in places the rate of decline in house 
prices has slowed significantly, and some companies are 
announcing jobs growth. The upside includes the labour 
market is in a relatively good state (compared to the UK) 
while monetary and fiscal policy remain supportive of 
economic recovery. These initial observations perhaps 
make it less likely that this outcome will prevail compared 
to the central forecast. 
 
The central forecast 
In this scenario the main drivers are: 
 
 A further tranche of money has gone to re-
capitalise the banks but lending behaviour 
remains sticky; 
 
 Confidence is very low and firms face 
considerable constraints while trying to continue 
trading; 
 
 External demand is also weak thus exports 
perform weakly and tourism revenues fall. The 
weakness of sterling cannot offset the poorer 
external demand; 
 
 The labour market is hit by a series of job losses 
but a significant number of workers remain in 
employment and this supports basic consumption; 
 
 The impact on the financial sector is quite sharp in 
2009 and 2010 and is felt across the rest of the 
economy and 
 House prices in Scotland are not as weak as that 
elsewhere in the UK and there are some early 
signs of some housing market segments showing 
growth as interest rates fall – this is the discerning 
and opportunistic buyer effects. 
 
This scenario is perhaps closest to what is happening at 
the moment but of course there are many other variables 
that could change the course of the economy. This is why 
the worst case scenario is considered below. 
 
 
The worst case scenario 
This scenario is presented because the impact of the 
financial crisis, and a sharp drop in the labour market, are 
important drivers. This early and sharp collapse of activity 
has repercussions for the path of recovery, as it tends to 
have a deeper recession with a slower recovery. The main 
factors here include: 
 
 The impact of the finance sector across the whole 
economy is severe and job losses in the economy 
come earlier in 2009 thus the support from the 
labour market weakens significantly; 
 
 Confidence collapses early in 2009 and it is very 
difficult to stimulate the economy; 
 
 External demand is very weak up to the end of 
2010 and perhaps into 2011; 
 
 Investment contracts substantially and there is 
little expectation of growth here until 2012 and 
 
 House prices in Scotland remain depressed for a 
longer period of time and as a result private 
housing investment continues to shrink until 2012. 
 
The outcome here is very disappointing and if this scenario 
were to come about there would be little growth in the 
economy until 2012 – a much longer and deeper recession 
than previously expected would take place. 
 
GVA 
The forecast for Scottish GVA is negative for 2009 and 
2010 in all the scenarios. Table 1 presents the forecasts for 
each of the scenarios for the years 2008 to 2010. Data for 
growth per annum is also given for the period 2005-07 and 
for 2009-12, which demonstrates the marked difference 
between the two periods as the economy experiences a 
recession. Figure 1 plots the probable paths of GVA over 
the period 2008 to 2012 for the three scenarios. Figure 1 
demonstrates that in the worst case that the recession 
could last until 2011 with only weak growth thereafter. In 
the best possible outcome the recession lasts until 2010 
and growth of 1 per cent is achieved in 2011 and by 2012 
growth is approaching 2 per cent.
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Table 1:   Forecast GVA Growth in the three scenarios, 2008-2012 
 
 
GVA Growth (%) 2008 2009 2010 2005-07
1
 2009-12
1
 
      
Optimistic 0.65 -1.90 -0.43 2.32 0.79 
Central 0.59 -2.57 -1.21 2.32 0.15 
Worse 0.51 -3.07 -1.65 2.32 -0.45 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
Note: 
1
This is per cent per annum 
 
 
Table 2:  Main forecasts of the Scottish economy (central scenario), 2008-2012 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2010-12 
     
GVA 0.59 -2.57 -1.21 0.15 
Agriculture 0.60 -2.85 -1.10 -0.14 
Manufacturing 0.60 -2.28 -1.34 -0.11 
Construction -2.73 -3.01 -1.21 0.14 
Services 0.98 -2.31 -1.30 0.17 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
Note: 
1
This is per cent per annum. 
 
In the central forecast the recession lasts until 2010 and 
Table 2 presents forecasts for the sectors under this 
scenario. All sectors are forecast to have negative growth 
in 2009 and 2010 and to return to positive growth in 2011. 
In 2009 the forecast is for all sectors to contract by more 
than 2 per cent with construction declining by just over 3 
per cent. In 2010 the picture is similar – most sectors shrink 
by just over 1 per cent. This reflects the broad base of the 
current recession. Previous recessions have left the 
service sector relatively unscathed, not so this time as the 
downturn affects the whole economy. Within services the 
expectations are for financial services, retail, tourism, 
business services and other private services to do worse 
while the public sector and transport, communication 
services do relatively better. The crucial importance of a 
strong public sector is clearly seen at this time when it will 
support employment and provide spending in areas where 
private consumption and investment are severely curtailed. 
 
Figures 2a to 2c demonstrate the impacts on the 
construction, manufacturing and service sectors for each of 
the scenarios. For each broad sector the pattern of the 
scenarios is the same, all show longer recovery as the 
scenarios worsen. Previously in the Scottish economy key 
sectors including manufacturing, electronics, financial 
services or REBS have driven growth in the economy. It is 
likely in the near to medium future that this will not be the 
case. Growth will be more broadly balanced and the 
influence that ‘key’ sectors may have, will not be as strong 
as in previous years. Manufacturing is hit by both the 
severe slowing in domestic demand and the deterioration 
in external demand. Key exports like food, whisky, paper, 
electronics etc. have all seen activity and orders drop 
sharply. The construction sector has suffered and 
continues to experience a considerable downturn due to 
the lack of private residential demand as house prices have 
collapsed and the bulk of that market remains stagnant. 
Public sector investment continues to provide some 
stimulus to the economy but the current tranche of PPP 
schools, hospitals etc. are coming to an end. The new 
funding arrangements for major public works are not in 
place yet and projects of this nature take a long time in the 
planning stage.  
 
Services are badly hit because of the sharp downturn in 
economic activity in the economy. Retail sales data is 
confounding as it shows the sector holding up to a degree 
but in truth is due to heavy discounting. Large expenditures 
are not being made as people see the drop in interest rates 
as a continued run so in part it is having the opposite 
effect. People believe rates will fall further thus hold off 
spending. Similarly companies postpone investment. 
These actions simply exacerbate the situation where 
minimal spending takes place. Tourism is weak as incomes 
and demand in foreign countries decline. Visitor spend is 
down as is business conferencing. Other private services, 
services related to housing are all down. Business services 
are likewise adversely affected. Without doubt however the 
most significant impact is on the financial sector in 
Scotland. The losses posted by RBS and HBOS are 
massive and it is difficult to see these banks returning to 
the large profits and aggressive acquisitions strategy that 
previously existed. This does not mean that these two 
major banks will revert to simply retail banking. They will 
maintain a large degree of specialist services and where 
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Figure 1   Forecast GVA growth for all three scenarios, 2008-2012 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
 
 
Figure 2a:  Forecast construction GVA growth, three scenarios, 2008-2012 
 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009
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profitable, retain some of their overseas operations. 
Investment banking and dealing in derivatives and 
securities may continue but there will be more stringent 
limits and supervision put in place both nationally and 
hopefully internationally, to ensure the risks of  such a 
catastrophe taking place again are minimised.  A mark of 
the international banking crisis is the extent to which most 
governments have taken substantial ownership of banks 
and nationalisation is widely accepted as necessary. As it 
is, this is what has happened and the interesting question 
is ‘how does the economy move forward so that this is not 
repeated and a situation of sustainable growth is 
achieved?’ 
 
In going forward there are two key factors to consider: 
 
 The strength of external demand – if this picks up 
then it will feed into exports and help 
manufacturing significantly. Tourism would also 
benefit if as predicted sterling remains weak. This 
would help stimulate retail and hotels & catering 
as well as other private services and 
 
 The speed and number of jobs lost in the 
beginning of 2009 is absolutely crucial. As time 
goes on the more people who remain in 
employment means that incomes are supported, 
as is consumption. Large numbers of people 
being ejected from the labour market will lead to a 
double whammy of a bigger strain on public 
finances (less taxes and more benefit spending) 
as well as the reduction on income thus 
weakening consumption and investment. On a 
large scale these have significant impacts on the 
economy going forward and have potentially very 
serious effects on the economy. 
 
Overall, the forecast for the Scottish economy is cautious 
but realistic. There is no clear way forward that indicates 
that the economy will go in a particular direction or grow at 
a particular rate. Each of the scenarios indicates a 
probable path that the economy could take. The central 
forecast is the most likely of them all. The downside risks 
would lead to the worse case scenario while it is unlikely 
that the Scottish economy can achieve the most optimistic 
case. If external demand remains very weak for a 
prolonged period and labour shedding is quick and jobs 
growth is sluggish for a couple of years then the worst case 
scenario could become reality. 
 
 
Employment 
Our forecasts of employment (for the central scenario) are 
presented in Table 3 with the net employment change 
figure in brackets. The employment figures are calibrated 
on the latest Employers’ Quarterly Survey Series as given 
in Table 6.06 in Economic and Labour Market Review, 
National Statistics.  
 
In the central forecast employment is forecast to decline by 
14,200 in 2008; by 94,200 in 2009 and by 51,400 in 2010. 
If this were to happen the economy would be facing one of 
the most serious job loss periods it has experienced. The 
forecast job loss for the period 2009-12 in this scenario is 
128,100 compared to 82,400 in the optimistic scenario. If 
the economy has a deep and prolonged recession (the 
worst case) then job loss over 2009-12 is forecast to be 
168,000. It appears that it will be impractical for the 
economy to shed this quantity of jobs without impacting 
adversely on unemployment (the forecasts of 
unemployment are presented in Table 4). 
 
In all the scenarios the service sector sheds a significant 
amount of jobs. The forecast is for services to lose 74,400 
in 2009 and a further 39,600 in 2010. This represents 78.9 
per cent of all job losses in 2009 and the comparative 
figure for 2010 is 77 per cent. The most significant jobs 
loss comes in services comes from the financial services 
sector. The assumption of the central forecast is that there 
is a significant jobs loss in both 2009 and 2010 from 
financial services. This could total 24,700 in 2009 and 
18,900 in 2010. This is because the sector will have some 
immediate costs to cut and these come mostly in 2009. As 
banks consolidate and review their activities then efficiency 
savings will bite in 2010 as cost-cutting continues. REBS 
also faces a major shakeout in 2009 with the forecast loss 
of 28,700 jobs. In the worst case scenario the jobs loss is 
considerable in both years, with a shedding of 25,200 and 
22,400 in 2010 for financial services. Elsewhere in this 
service sector the jobs loss is weighted towards 2009 and 
REBS is forecast to lose 33,000 jobs but only 11,200 in the 
year 2010. Similarly, retail is forecast to lose 16,300 jobs in 
2009 but less in 2010; 10,900.  
 
The construction sector is forecast to lose 8,000 jobs in 
2009 under the central forecast but this could be as high as 
8,800 in the worst case scenario. Under this scenario it 
loses 4,300 jobs in 2010 compared to 2,900 in the central 
case. 
 
Manufacturing job losses are spread across the sector 
relatively evenly. The exceptions to this are: ORNF, 
chemicals and transport equipment. The former two shed 
only a small number of jobs while transport equipment is 
buoyed by positive job growth of 1,600 in 2009 due to 
shipbuilding orders for naval vessels on the Clyde and at 
Rosyth. Over the forecast period manufacturing is forecast 
to shed 14,400 jobs in the central scenario but this could 
be as high as 20,100 if the worst case prevails. The other 
sectors, especially those with export markets, tend to have 
much higher job losses forecast as activity reduces 
sharply. It is unlikely that firms will hoard labour for a longer 
time and this is a key danger as skills will be lost as jobs 
are shed swelling the ranks of the unemployed.  
 
Unemployment 
We present our forecasts of unemployment in Table 4. 
Both the ILO measure and claimant count measure are 
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Figure 2b:  Forecast manufacturing GVA growth, three scenarios, 2008-2012  
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
 
Figure 2c:   Forecast services GVA growth, three scenarios, 2008-2012 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
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Table 3:  Forecasts of Scottish employment (000s) and net employment change, (central scenario) 2008-2012 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2009-12 
Total Employment 2,384.6 2,290.4 2,239.0  
 (-14,200) (-94,200) (-51,400) (-128,100) 
Agriculture 33.3 31.1 29.0  
 (4,000) (-2,200) (-2,100) (-2,400) 
Manufacturing 216.3 207.4 201.4  
 (-4,700) (-8,900) (-6,100) (-14,400) 
Construction 137.2 129.3 126.3  
 (-2,000) (-8,000) (-3,000) (1,500) 
Services 1,955.8 1,881.4 1,841.8  
 (-10,800) (-83,500) (-48,500) (-100,900) 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Forecasts of Scottish Unemployment (Central Scenario), 2008-2010 
 
 2008 2009 2010 
ILO Unemployment 137,200 184,400 209,900 
Rate 5.1% 6.9% 7.9% 
Claimant Count 77,800 110,600 125,900 
Rate 2.9% 3.9% 4.3% 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Forecast claimant count unemployment, three scenarios, 2008-2012 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
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given. The preferred measure of unemployment 
however is ILO unemployment as given by the LFS. 
Figure 3 illustrates the different outcomes for claimant 
count unemployment in the three scenarios. 
 
The forecast for unemployment has changed 
somewhat over the most recent period. It had been 
the case that the Scottish labour market had been 
outperforming the UK labour market and still does in 
relative terms. This had led to an employment rate 
that was higher than that of the UK and 
unemployment that was at historically low levels. The 
forecast for the central scenario is that unemployment 
will rise from 5.1 per cent in 2008 to 7.9 per cent in 
2010 before falling at a much slower rate to 7.5 in 
2012. In the worst case scenario unemployment is 
forecast to peak at 8.5 per cent in 2011 indicating the 
different profile of unemployment in this situation. The 
claimant count forecast is for unemployment to peak 
at 125,900 (4.3 per cent) in 2009 whereas the 
forecast for the worst case scenario is that it is at its 
highest in 2011 at 135,700 (4.7 per cent). Claimant 
count unemployment currently stands at 77,800 (2.9 
per cent) for 2008. 
 
Figure 3 show the likely paths unemployment could 
take, where the first two scenarios plateau over 2010 
to 2011. The change in the worst case scenario is that 
it continues to rise but does not have a flat portion. 
Using the claimant count measure more people will 
fall into inactivity and stop claiming benefits over 
protracted periods of time. Data from previous 
recessions indicate that in a severe recession (say 
that of the 1980s in Scotland) unemployment 
continues to rise after such a deep and long 
recession. So in the case of the worst scenario 
unemployment may continue to climb even after 
growth and jobs creation takes place. Deskilling, jobs 
mismatch and discouraged workers all add to this. 
 
Kenneth Low 
20
th
 February 2009 
 
